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Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics
DAVID LUBAN*
INTRODUCTION
Lon Fuller is the greatest American philosopher to devote serious attention to
the ethics of lawyers. Indeed, he is arguably the greatest philosopher since Plato
to do so. I don't suggest that Fuller was a philosopher of Plato's magnitude, but it
is not preposterous to mention Plato and Fuller in the same breath. Their unique
affinity was that both were thinkers whose broader philosophical concerns may
plausibly be said to arise from reflections on the craft of law. In Plato's case, the
effort to understand forensic argument, and to analyze why opinions about justice
might be persuasive without being true, drives the inquiry in the Gorgias, the
Republic, and the Sophist, and weaves in and out of the Apology, Theatetus,
Phaedrus, Protagoras, and Laws. In a sense, lawyers and their discourse
represent for Plato all that is false and fallen in human life. Plato's ideas about the
true and the good take shape as a response to the institutions that condemned
Socrates.
Fuller also had an interest in forensic argument, and a major focus of his
writing on legal ethics concerns the adversary system and the role of partisan-
advocacy in a decent social order. But Fuller's true passion was the role of the
lawyer as an "architect of social structure" 1 - the transactional lawyer rather
than the litigator, the solicitor rather than the barrister. To a striking degree,
Fuller's philosophy of law and social thought arise from his contra-Platonic
appreciation of the social usefulness of lawyers - lawyers comprehended under
the aspect of Vishnu the preserver, not Shiva the destroyer. Fuller's ideas about
social order systematically generalize his appreciation of what kind of work good
lawyers do, and it is not at all clear whether his anti-positivism generates or (as I
sometimes think) derives from his ideas about lawyers' work. Whether this
central strand of Fuller's thought can be reconciled with his defense of the
adversary system is a question I address later in this Article.
* Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. I presented this paper
at a conference entitled "Rediscovering Fuller," at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, September 12-13,
1997. Many thanks to the participants at this conference, and particularly to Wibren van der Burg, who offered
incisive comments on the paper. I also wish to thank my colleagues at Georgetown, who discussed the paper at a
faculty workshop. Particular thanks go to Heidi L. Feldman, who gave me extensive comments on an earlier
draft.
1. LON L. FULLER, The Lawyer as Architect of Social Structure [hereinafter Lawyer as Architect], in THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FU.LER 269 (1981) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL ORDER].
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I. FULLER'S PARTIAL ECLIPSE
In the past three decades, Fuller's writings have fallen into partial eclipse.
Philosophy of law students will probably read nothing of Fuller's work be-
yond - at most - the Problem of the Grudge Informer,2 the King Rex parable,3
and perhaps the discussion of legal interpretation excerpted from his debate with
Hart. The Law In Quest of itself4 and Anatomy of the Law5 are out of print;
Fuller's name does not appear even in the index of George Fletcher's recent and
admirable introductory textbook on jurisprudence. Yet, in many ways, Fuller is
the most satisfying and suggestive twentieth century writer on jurisprudence -
the only one, in my view, who successfully knits together the abstract and the
concrete, in the sense that his philosophy emerges seamlessly from the practice of
law. What accounts for his neglect among legal scholars and students?
In large part, Fuller fell victim to a number of accidents. One was the fact that
his great attack on legal positivism, The Law In Quest of Itself, appeared twenty
years before Hart's The Concept of Law,6 which philosophers quickly came to
think had superseded all earlier forms of positivism. The Law In Quest of Itself
takes as its target a group of writers that no philosophers of the 1960s read
seriously, or, to tell the truth, read at all (who was Soml6, anyway?). 7 Moreover,
Fuller indulges in speculations about the psychology of legal positivism, empha-
sizing its love-affair with statist coercion, that would be very cheap shots if
applied to Hart's non-coercion based alternative. When I took my first philosophy
of law course in graduate school in 1971, The Concept of Law was its centerpiece,
and Fuller's name was never mentioned.
Nonetheless, the brilliant second lecture of The Law In Quest of Itself, in which
Fuller turns the tables on positivists by demonstrating that it is they, not the
natural lawyers, who rely on occult entities and metaphysical postulations, can
readily be applied to Hart's theory.8 Had post-Hart legal philosophers done so, I
suspect that The Law In Quest of Itself might have achieved the status I believe it
deserves, as the most persuasive critique of legal positivism ever written.
In part, post-Hart legal philosophers ignored Fuller's 1940 book because, as
Kenneth Winston observes, "the generation of scholars immediately succeeding
him regarded his work as failing to meet the standards of argument set by the
dominant mode of discourse in Anglo-American philosophy." 9 Winston puts the
2. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 245-53 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW].
3. Id. at 33-38.
4. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940) [hereinafter FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF].
5. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968) [hereinafter FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW].
6. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
7. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF, supra note 4, at 26-41(discussing writings of SomI6).
8. Id. at 45-95; see discussion infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (demonstrating the applicability of
Fuller's critique to Hart's theory).
9. Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction to Special Issue on Lon Fuller, 13 LAW & PHIL. 253, 253 (1994).
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matter diplomatically. English-speaking philosophy of the 1960s was dominated
by the Oxbridge schools of Austin and Wittgenstein, of which Hart seemed the
jurisprudential incarnation.'o Those old enough to have been studying or practic-
ing philosophy in those years well remember the sense that a revolution was
on - an Oxford-centered revolution that would sweep so-called "traditional
philosophy" into the trashcan.
The triumphalism of the linguistic philosophers, the utter contempt in which
they held all other philosophers, and their exhilarating sense that the New
Methods would at last bring philosophical liberation, all meant that Fuller didn't
stand a chance. Conspicuous among the New Methods was a kind of relentless
anality in argumentative style that Fuller lacked. (A friend who was at Cornell
University in those halcyon years when its philosophy department was a
Wittgensteinian beehive recalled to me, "It was fabulous. Back then, whenever a
visitor gave a paper, the main criticism was that we didn't understand his
argument - and when someone on the faculty said they didn't understand his
argument, they really didn't understand his argument! He was finished!" Libera-
tion through constipation may seem puzzling, but there you have it.) Hart himself
was too fine and too catholic a spirit to indulge in the kind of trashing that was the
spirit of the time, but it was obvious to every self-respecting linguistic philoso-
pher that after Hart's book, Fuller was not someone worth taking seriously.
A small but significant point was that Fuller's rhetoric was all wrong. To take
just one example, his occasional use of the word "intelligent" instead of
"rational" as a term of approbation was enough to make a linguistic philoso-
pher's skin crawl. It sounded all too reminiscent of John Dewey and William
James, whom Gilbert Ryle once derided as "those Great American Bores.""
More damning was Fuller's conviction that oughts and ises can't be separated -
this at a time when linguistic philosophers were convinced that ethics consists in
analyzing something called "the logic of moral language," which is surely of a
different kind from "the logic of" other languages. It is instructive to re-read
Ronald Dworkin's 1965 criticism of The Morality of Law, which asks rhetorically
10. J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein were lumped together, perhaps unfairly, by the so-called "ordinary
language philosophers" of the 1950s and 1960s, who believed that both of them had devised a method for
showing that philosophical problems are all pseudo-problems. The method consisted of attending very closely
to the ordinary meanings of words and the distinctions we draw in ordinary language. As Wittgenstein put it,
"When philosophers use a word.., one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used this way in the
language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their
everyday use." LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 48e § 116 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3rd
ed. 1958). See J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 181-82 (JO. Urmson &
G.J. Warnock eds., 2nd ed., 1970) (describing the method of ordinary language philosophy). Hart acknowledges
the influence in his preface: "[Alt many points, I have raised questions which may well be said to be about the
meanings of words ... In this field of study it is particularly true that we may use, as Professor J.L. Austin said,
a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena.' " HART, supra note 6, at vii.
11. IGOR STRAVINSKY & ROBERT CRAFT, THEMES AND EPISODES 250 (1967) (Robert Craft is quoting from his
diary, recollecting Ryle's table talk).
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what Fuller's instrumental arguments have to do with morality, as a period-piece
(though it is not only a period-piece). ' 2 In the 1960s, everyone just knew that the
moral and extra-moral uses of "good" were logically distinct. Only recently are
we able to treat Dworkin's question as anything but a rhetorical one - and,
perforce, to answer it. 3
Nowadays it is hard even to remember, let alone comprehend, the passionate
dogmatism of those days, which rested on unarticulated prejudices inherited from
logical positivism. Today, virtually all the titillating post-positivist research
programs that in the 1960s made Fuller's world-view seem silly and antiquated
have themselves sunk into the tar pits with hardly a residual bubble to mark their
passing. Even the term "linguistic philosophy" sounds dated, like "key punch
operator." Perhaps now we can read Fuller seriously once again.
If we do not, that is partly because Dworkin has assumed the anti-positivist
mantle that Fuller once held. Yet it is striking how Fullerian some of Dworkin's
arguments now seem. To take a conspicuous example, The Law In Quest of Itself
clearly anticipates Dworkin's well-known chain novel metaphor from Law's
Empire.t 4 In order to show that the is and the ought are hard to separate in human
affairs, Fuller illustrates with the analogy of a person trying to retell a joke he has
heard. The retelling "will be the product of two forces: (1) the story as I heard it,
the story as it is at the time of its first telling; (2) my conception of the point of the
story, in other words, my notion of the story as it ought to be." 15 These
correspond with Dworkin's idea that applying law to a new case is like
continuing someone else's incomplete story, an effort that requires us to consider
both how well our furthering of the story fits the story as it was handed to us, and
how well it advances it. Like Fuller, Dworkin argues that there is no sharp
distinction between the two, 16 and, like Fuller, Dworkin insists that to continue
the story we must (re)formulate its point.1 7
I do not mean to deny that Dworkin's jurisprudence is more proficient than
Fuller's, nor to assert that Fuller is as important a philosopher. Dworkin's range
of interests is not only different than Fuller's, but considerably broader. I do mean
to assert that Dworkin's range of interests is not only broader than Fuller's, but
considerably different. In particular, Fuller had a lively interest in the work that
12. Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law - Observations Prompted By Professor Fuller's Novel
Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 670,674-75 (1965).
13. For two attempts to answer the question, see ROBERT SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 37-38, 69 (1984); Jeremy
Waldron, Why Law- Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW & PHIL. 259 (1994).
14. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-54 (1986) (comparing the common law to a novel written by a
group of authors, each of whom adds a chapter and passes the manuscript on to the next, so that a judge should
view previous decisions by other judges as "part of a long story he must interpret and continue .... Id. at
238-39.
15. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF, supra note 4, at 8.
16. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 239.
17. Id. at 228-32.
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lawyers actually do, an interest that, so far as I can tell, Dworkin completely
lacks. And that interest, of course, is my topic.
One substantive difference between Fuller and Dworkin - indeed, not only
Dworkin but the larger Zeitgeist of post-1960 legal theory - may also help
explain Fuller's partial eclipse. As Owen Fiss perceptively notes, Fuller was a
contracts scholar who was not only more interested in private law than in public
law, but who regarded private law as the template to which public law should
mold itself.1 8 In Fiss's terms, that means that Fuller erroneously viewed adjudica-
tion as dispute resolution rather than structural reform, and argued against the
legitimacy of the "public law judge" - the heroic judges of the civil rights era,
who reformulated procedure to embrace the polycentric disputes Fuller believed
were unsuited for adjudication. 19
But the difference runs deeper than the theory of adjudication. Apart from
lawyer-economists, all the most prominent American legal theorists of the past
three decades have been public law scholars through-and-through, in the same
expanded sense that Fuller was a private law scholar though-and-through: not
only are these theorists more interested in public law questions, but they mold
private law issues to a public law template. Even theorists such as Duncan
Kennedy or Patricia Williams, who share Fuller's origins as contract scholars,
make private law look like public law. 20 Fuller's thought runs so firmly against
the public-law grain of contemporary scholarship that it would be astonishing if
he were taken seriously.
2 1
A final explanation of Fuller's partial eclipse may lie in political reactions to
his work. Fuller regarded bureaucratic reform from above with a great deal of
suspicion, applauding Edmund Burke for placing more reliance in the organic
institutions of society.22 Fuller claimed that he was probably brought to "this
conservative philosophy by my experiences in Germany and France," 23 both of
them bureaucratic states in the 1920s and 1930s. Fuller's realist adversaries
regarded The Law In Quest of Itself- perhaps correctly - as an oblique assault
on New Deal bureaucratic statism, and Thomas Reed Powell accused him of
18. Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 39-44 (1979) (giving an extensive
critique of Fuller's account of adjudication).
19. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1304 (1976).
20. See generally, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1982); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991).
21. One of the many virtues of James Boyle's interesting paper on Fuller is that Boyle criticizes Fuller's
public jurisprudence for its faithlessness to his private law insights. James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social
Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371
(1993). This, I suspect, is a criticism that Fuller himself would take to heart, because it echoes the predominance
his own thinking places on private jurisprudence.
22. Letter from Lon L. Fuller to Thomas Reed Powell, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note I, at 297.
23. Id. at 298.
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espousing views similar to those of Calvin Coolidge.24 Anyone who has read
Fuller's reply to Hart,25 or The Problem of the Grudge Informer,26 knows that
Fuller was preoccupied with Germany's descent into fascism, and more generally
with the rise of totalitarian regimes. In the 1960s, Fuller may have been regarded
as something of a cold warrior, especially after he worked on Richard Nixon's
1960 presidential campaign. Nor could readers have been entirely oblivious to his
quick and silly a priori argument for the moral superiority of capitalism in The
Morality of Law.27 Political progressives surely found the undertones of Fuller's
work uncongenial.
Here, too, however, Fuller's neglect is unjust. In fact, very few legal philoso-
phers have less of a political agenda than Fuller, and his suspicion of what is
today called "legal centralism" is fully compatible with progressive political
ideas as well as conservative ones. Indeed, the critique of legal centralism figures
prominently in Critical Legal Studies. In any case, political discourse in much of
the world has recently shifted to an emphasis on civil society, that is, autonomous
sub-state institutions of the sort that Fuller analyzed so sympathetically and
astutely. Contemporary theorists of civil society would do well indeed to study
Fuller. Perhaps today we can re-read Fuller without jumping to hasty conclusions
about a hidden and possibly noxious political agenda.
II. FULLER AS A LEGAL ETHICIST
Fuller was not only an important philosopher of legal ethics, he was also, for a
period of time, quite an influential one. During the 1950s, he co-chaired a legal
ethics commission, the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, spon-
sored by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS). In 1958, the Joint Conference published an influential
report on professional responsibility authored by Fuller and his co-chair, a lawyer
named John Randall.28 Judging by both the style and the content, it seems clear
that this Joint Conference Report was entirely, or almost entirely, Fuller's
handiwork. When the ABA rewrote its code of ethics in the 1960s, the resulting
Model Code of Professional Responsibility29 took over numerous ideas from the
Joint Conference Report, and its footnotes quote directly from the Report eleven
times, more than any other single source.30 Moreover, the Model Code divided its
rules into aspirational "Ethical Considerations" and mandatory "Disciplinary
24. Id. at 293.
25. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law -A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
26. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 245-53.
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.
J. 1159 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report].
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE.].
30. Id. According to Professor John Sutton, the reporter who drafted the Model Code and who (along with
one other member of the drafting committee) added the footnotes after the Model Code was complete, the upper
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Rules." ' 3 1 This structure was partly inspired by Fuller's distinction between the
moralities of aspiration and duty in The Morality of Law.32 For that matter, even
when the Model Code was replaced in 1983, the early drafts of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 33 that supplanted it followed one of Fuller's chief ideas in
the Joint Conference Report, that of writing different rules depending on what
role (advocate, counselor, public servant) the lawyer was playing. 34 The structure
was partly abandoned in the final version, and as John DiPippa argues, the
jurisprudence of the Model Rules is largely hostile to Fuller's ideas.35
One knows a priori, so to speak, how a Fullerian analysis of legal ethics should
run. There should be an outer morality concerned with the content of legal
representations, and perhaps with issues such as a lawyer's honesty. But the
interesting part of the analysis would bean effort to discover an inner morality of
the legal profession, that is, a morality that makes law practice possible. The
inner morality, professional ethics in the proper sense of the term, would consist
of functional virtues and duties. Such prominent features of legal ethics as the
duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality, and avoiding conflicts of interest,
would be delineated and defended by examining their functional contribution to
carrying out the work lawyers do. "So it is with all social institutions. We must
ask of them what purposes they serve in society and then reason out what
restraints must be observed if those purposes are to be achieved." 36
The procedure Fuller envisions is a familiar one. First, ascertain the nature of
professionals' work ("the purposes they serve in society"). 37 Second, devise an
appropriate method for morally assessing its purposes and their necessities.38
Third, following that method, "reason out what restraints must be observed if
those purposes are to be achieved.", 39 Fuller has illuminating ideas on all of these
topics.
echelon of the ABA was extremely proud of the Joint Conference Report and wanted it referred to. Telephone
interview with John Sutton (Aug. 18, 1997).
31. MODEL CODE preliminary statement.
32. Interview with John Sutton, supra note 30. Professor Sutton was appointed reporter of the committee that
drafted the Model Code in 1964, and approached his task by reading voluminously on ethics and law. He
recollects that Fuller's newly-published The Morality of Law, along with writings of Bishop James Pike,
influenced him most strongly. According to Professor Sutton, he and Edward Wright (who chaired the
committee that produced the Model Code) believed that one of their important tasks in replacing its predecessor
was to eliminate its confusion between moral exhortation and enforceable obligation, and Sutton found Fuller's
discussion useful in formulating his thinking on this issue. Id.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
34. For an interesting and detailed discussion of Fuller's ideas in the regulation of American lawyers, see
John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller, The Model Code, and The Model Rules, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 303 (1996).
35. Id. The Model Rules eliminates all aspirational rules except the recommendation that lawyers do pro
bono work.
36. Lon L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 1995 ELEC. ENG. 916, 917 [hereinafter Fuller, Codes of
Ethics].
37. Id.
38. Id. at 916.
39. Id. at 917.
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Ill. THE DIALECTIC OF ENDS AND MEANS
Consider first his method for morally assessing the worth of professional
activities and of the duties they entail. Fuller argues that professional duties
should not be judged by "ethical standards ... independent of time, place, and
circumstance"; 40 nor, however, should they be judged only from the internal
standpoint of the profession. Instead, judging them "always involves a reciprocal
adjustment between ends and means.",41 Some professional ends may seem
morally attractive until we discover how costly or odious the available means are,
and some professional duties may seem unconscionable until we consider how
much injury abandoning them would do to a worthwhile institution.
A good example (unfortunately, not one that Fuller analyzed) is the duty of
confidentiality in the professions of law, medicine, and journalism. In all of them,
the argument for confidentiality is the same: clients, patients, and news sources
will hold back important information unless they can be sure it won't return to
haunt them. Confidentiality, we may say, belongs to the role morality of these
professions.
But what if the confidential information is that the wrong person is being
executed for the client's crime? Or that one's HIV-positive patient is having
unprotected sex with an unsuspecting partner? What if testimony by the news
source could prevent an innocent person from going to prison, if only the reporter
revealed the source's name? In cases like these, the professional role morality
conflicts with common morality.
One plausible argument is that role morality wins if the role is sufficiently
valuable and the duty of confidentiality is sufficiently indispensable to carrying it
out. The first step of analysis, then, is to assess the goodness of the role. Strong
reasons for the role justify role morality that deviates sharply from common
morality; weak reasons for the role may be adequate to show that the role should
exist, but they can justify only slight deviations from common morality.
I call this argument "plausible" in part because it is one that I have defended at
considerable length in my own writing on legal ethics. 42 Yet Fuller would have
little patience with it. You cannot judge the goodness of the role in the abstract, he
would say, without understanding what kind of actions its role morality would
require; and you cannot condemn professional practices (such as keeping
confidences in the three problem cases) merely because they "shock the con-
science," without asking whether abandoning the practice would undermine
social goals as central as providing legal and medical services or reporting the
news. Instead, you bootstrap yourself into both judgments. I suspect that Fuller is
right.
40. Id. at 916.
41. Id.
42. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-47 (1988); David Luban, Freedom and
Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424 (1990).
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When Fuller speaks of a process of "reciprocal adjustment between ends and
means," I take it that he has in mind a counterpart in practice to John Rawls's
notion of reflective equilibrium in theory.43 Rawls asks us to adjust our principles
and our considered moral judgments until they are in equilibrium with each
other.44 Fuller asks us to modify our ends and means until they are both morally
acceptable - more precisely, until the end, as modified, no longer requires means
that are unconscionable.
In the confidentiality example, reciprocal adjustment might mean something
like this: try experimenting with various exceptions to the duty of confidentiality,
and see whether the modified confidentiality rule discourages so much essential
communication that the job of a doctor, lawyer, or reporter becomes impossible.
In the case of lawyers, different American states have adopted a staggering
variety of confidentiality exceptions: permission to reveal confidences to prevent
client crimes against life or limb;45 obligation to reveal confidences to prevent
client crimes against life or limb; 46 obligation to reveal confidences to save
human life, regardless of whether a crime is involved; 47 permission to reveal any
crime whatsoever; 48 permission (or obligation) to reveal crimes (or non-criminal
frauds) against property; 49 permission (or obligation) to reveal crimes or frauds
in which the lawyer's services were unwittingly used;50 obligation to keep client
confidences in any or all of these circumstances; 5' and various combinations of
these rules.
It may turn out (I believe that it has turned out) that none of these exceptions
seriously hampers the practice of law by discouraging clients from telling
lawyers what they need to know. In that case, there is no need to modify our
intuitive judgment that keeping confidences in the problem cases is wrong. The
43. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971).
44. Id.
45. Summaries of and references to the specific rules are presented in tabular form in THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1998 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 134-39 (1998) [hereinafter
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS].
46. Id.
47. Florida's Current Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-1.6(b)(2) provides that a lawyer "shall reveal"
information the lawyer believes "necessary... to prevent death or substantial bodily harm."
48. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 134-39.
49. Permission to reveal criminal frauds: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
Obligation to reveal criminal frauds: Florida, New Jersey, Virginia, Wisconsin. Permission to reveal non-
criminal frauds: Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah. Obligation to
reveal non-criminalfrauds: New Jersey, Wisconsin. Id.
50. Permission: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin. Obligation: Georgia, Hawaii, Ohio. Id.
51. Id. Most noteworthy for the stringency of its protection of client confidences is California, the only state
to forbid lawyers from revealing client confidences under any circumstances, including those in which
revelation is necessary to prevent the client from committing suicide.
1998] 809
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blanket confidentiality rule is not essential to the practice of law. With other
exceptions to confidentiality, the story may be different. American rules in most
jurisdictions now require lawyers to reveal to the court that a client has
committed perjury, and I believe that this rule has made the job of criminal
defense more difficult. Lawyers know that defendants facing prison have an
overwhelming temptation to perjure themselves. For that reason, lawyers take
care not to learn too much for fear of having to reveal that a client's testimony is
false. You can't reveal what you don't know. Sometimes this strategy backfires,
when the lawyer fails to learn facts crucial to the defense. Here, the lawyer's role
has been pared back to accommodate a rule that seems good.
A final class of cases is those in which we modify our judgment that keeping a
client's confidence is wrong. On the face of it, keeping secret a client's confession
that he has committed the crime he is accused of is wrong because it defeats the
ends of justice. But if every defense lawyer revealed every confession, it is hard
to imagine that defendants would trust lawyers enough to make use of their
services at all, and then an institution essential to a decent society would collapse.
Here, the conclusion is that keeping the client's guilty secrets is the morally right
thing to do.
These examples suggest that Fuller's dialectic of ends and means represents a
plausible process of moral deliberation. It *sheds genuine light on the problem of
role morality.
IV. THE WORK OF LAWYERS
According to Fuller, what do lawyers do? This is not an easy question. In the
Joint Conference Report he cautions that in "developing fields[,] the precise
contribution of the legal profession is as yet undefined ' 52 and that the bar's
traditions "yield but an indirect guidance.", 53 He once wrote that "[t]he best
definition I ever heard of a lawyer. . .'is a man that helps people.", 54 Of course
this is not a serious definition, since it fails to distinguish a lawyer from a dentist.
Fuller goes on to explain his meaning through the metaphor of arranging "a
complex of human beings and human institutions" in social space "so that they
may work together ' 55 - "so arranging and ordering the pieces that they will
least interfere with one another."' 56 A lawyer's help differs from a dentist's
because "[w]e want every one to be as free as possible, and the task of the law is
to discover the ways in which this can be accomplished.",
57
52. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1159.
53. Id. at 1160.
54. Lon L. Fuller, On Legal Education, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 275-76.
55. Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 276-77.
57. Id. at 277. This view is congruent with Fuller's argument that "[t]he law does not tell a man what he
should do to accomplish specific ends set by the lawgiver; it furnishes him with baselines against which to
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Notice that in this final sentence, Fuller shifts from talking about what lawyers
do to talking about what the law does. This is characteristic of Fuller's jurispru-
dence, which repeatedly insists that the practical point of any philosophy of law
lies in what it implies about lawyers' work. Time and again, Fuller criticizes
jurisprudential theories by arguing that if the law is X (i.e., whatever the theory in
question says the law is), it follows that a lawyer's job- is Y, where Y will
subsequently be seen as both unrealistic (because lawyers don't actually spend
much time doing Y) and undesirable (because a lawyer who approaches clients'
problems as if the point of the effort is to Y will make a mess of things). Recall
how Fuller begins The Law In Quest of Itself.
Yet if in these definitions the word "law" means the life work of the lawyer, it
is apparent that something more vital than a verbal dispute hinges on the choice
between them. Surely the man who conceives his task as that of reducing the
relations of men to a reasoned harmony will be a different kind of lawyer from
one who regards his task as that of charting the behavior sequences of certain
elderly state officials. And if the lawyer shapes himself by his conception of the
law, so also, to the extent of his influence, does he in turn shape the society in
which he lives.58
In one of his essays, Fuller observes that a legal formalist considers the lawyer
"to be an expert in the necessary implications of certain basic legal concepts."
' 5 9
It is precisely to attack this view that Holmes begins The Path of the Law by
reminding us that the actual work of the lawyer is often representing a "bad man"
who doesn't give a damn about the implications of legal concepts, and who cares
only about whether unpleasant material consequences will be visited on him by
the state. 6° Indeed, we may take a cue from Holmes's remarkable opening
paragraph and read The Path of the Law in Fuller's manner - as an essay on the
nature of legal practice that veers into jurisprudence principally because jurispru-
dence matters to law practice.6 '
Fuller is wholly in sympathy with Holmes's realist complaint about how little
the formalist definition of a lawyer has to do with the actual practice of law. But
Fuller is equally unhappy with the realists' alternative, the idea that a lawyer is
organize his life with his fellows .... Law provides a framework for the citizen within which to live his own
life .... [T]he central purpose of law is to furnish baselines for human interaction." Lon L. Fuller, Human
Interaction and the Law, in FULLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 234. In Freedom - A
Suggested Analysis, Fuller writes that "to become effective, freedom requires a congenial environment of rules
and decisions." Lon L. Fuller, Freedom -A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1314 (1955).
58. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF, supra note 4, at 3-4.
59. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 269.
60. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 170 (1920).
61. For two recent readings of Holmes's classic essay in this vein, see Robert W. Gordon, Law as a Vocation:
Holmes and the Lawyer's Path, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: "THE PATH OF THE LAW" AND ITS
INFLUENCE (Steven Burton ed. forthcoming), and my own comment on Gordon in David Luban, The Bad Man
and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (1997).
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"an expert in predicting and influencing the incidence of state force.", 62 In his
essay The Needs ofAmerican Legal Philosophy, he explains:
[T]he most serious deficiency in the view that identifies the lawyer's work with
established state power ... lies in the fact that it distorts the services that
lawyers are actually rendering in our society. It is essentially a litigational
conception of the lawyer's competence, and yet we know that the number of
lawyers directly concerned with litigation is every day decreasing and consti-
tutes today a minority of the profession as a whole.
6 3
Fuller is aware of the counter-argument that even office lawyers and business
negotiators are "also ultimately concerned with litigation and state power, though
in an indirect way. When a lawyer drafts a contract, for example, he has his eyes
on possible future litigation . ... "64 But Fuller views this as a simple-minded
response. Seeing why takes us to the heart of Fuller's conception of the lawyer as
an architect of social structure.
Take a simple example that Fuller himself employs: "working out a contract
for a two years' supply of paper towels for the rest rooms of a chain of service
stations.", 65 The "conception that defines the lawyer's lifework entirely in terms
of state power" 66 views the lawyer's task as "battening down the hatches against
possible future litigation.", 67 Fuller acknowledges that this is one thing the
draftsman does, but he insists that it is not the only thing, nor the important thing.
The important thing, of course, is getting paper towels into service station rest
rooms, and the lawyer's job is to help the parties create a structure of interaction
that will facilitate that task.
The structure of interaction comprises more than the terms of the contract.
Fuller distinguishes carefully between the contract and the agreement.68 Lawyers
write the contract, but if they, rather than the parties, create the agreement -
well, don't count on finding paper towels in your service station rest room! The
agreement gets produced when
the parties, by being compelled to work out together the framework of their
future relations, come to share an understanding of the problems each of them
faces in the performance of his side of the undertaking. This understanding is
often itself the source of a set of reciprocally adjusted expectations that
62. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 269.
63. Lon L. Fuller, The Needs ofAmerican Legal Philosophy, in FULLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra
note 1, at 252 [hereinafter Fuller, American Legal Philosophy]. However, it is also instructive to note that Fuller
praises what he calls the "ethical implication" of realism, namely that realism "treats law as something capable
of being shaped to meet human needs and to increase human satisfactions, and there is conveyed the implication
that it should be so shaped." Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 253.
65. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 265.
66. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 63, at 250.
67. Id. at 253.
68. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 265.
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functions as a basis of order between the parties without reference to the written
contract, and often better than the written contract would.69
A good lawyer, realizing this, "sees to it that the parties have reached common
ground as well as common language." 7 ° When that happens the parties may
never have to consult the contract.7 ' Conversely, he warns, a bad lawyer "may
fail to provide a workable arrangement capable of achieving the results intended
even when it is completely 'litigation-proof.' ,72 And the problem with the realist
lawyer, who identifies law with state power and legal skill with litigation and
litigation-proofing, is that his philosophy erases this distinction.
Remarkably, what we find in Fuller's analysis of the paper towel contract is
three ideas basic to his jurisprudence: the idea of implicit law, his non-positivist,
or, as I shall say, pluralist, notion of law apart from the state, and the insistence
that practical arrangements are subject to natural laws susceptible to reasoned
understanding.
Implicit law. There is hardly a better definition of implicit law than Fuller's
language in the paper-towel example: "a set of reciprocally adjusted expectations
that functions as a basis of order between the parties."' 7 3 If law is, in Fuller's
formula, "a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,",7 4
we must realize that rules don't have to be produced by the state, and that they
may be unarticulated and implicit in coordinated human practices, without
ceasing to be legal rules.75 It may well be that the agreement, not the contract,
between the service station chain and the paper towel distributor represents the
law of this bargain. Yet only the contract will be the subject of litigation, and thus
"Ithe conception of the lawyer as an expert in established state power cannot be
stretched to include his special competence as an architect of social structures. 76
Non-positivist law. Fuller's conception of implicit law, including customary
law and tacit patterns of cooperation and reliance, is connected with his critique
of legal positivism in the second lecture of The Law In Quest of Itself.77 There
Fuller argues that the intricate division of authority in modem legal systems
makes it impossible to specify a master criterion - what Hart would later call a
"rule of recognition" - satisfied by all and only "the law that is."' 78 The claim
that there is such a thing as a rule of recognition in a legal system turns out to be a
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 266.
73. Id. at 265.
74. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 2 at 46.
75. See Gerald J. Postema, Implicit Law, 13 LAW AND PHIL. 301, 363-65 (1994) (discussing Fuller's
distinction between made rules and implicit rules).
76. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 63, at 253.
77. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF, supra note 4, at 45-95.
78. Id. at 27-28, 45-47, 69.
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positivist article of faith, not an empirical fact. 79 Thus, "the law that is" is not an
empirical concept - ironically, it is just what the realists accused natural law of
being: wish-law. Even the vague claim that some set or other of official
performances makes law law turns out to beg questions, because the very notion
of an official performance presupposes a system of law that authorizes some
people as officials. 80 Thus, the realist program of defining law in terms of official
behavior requires that law first be defined in terms of lay behavior, in the
reciprocal interaction by which some people come to acknowledge others as
officials.81 But then, positivism in its realist form "approaches perilously close to
the proposition that the law is the way everyone behaves." 
82
These arguments undermine the three principal positivist themes: (1) that law
is an empirical social fact, (2) that law is a creature of the state, and (3) that the
law that is differs conceptually from the law that ought to be (a claim that is not so
much false as vacuous, absent some concrete criterion for identifying "the law
that is"). But, for Fuller, the point is not merely a polemic against positivism. The
arguments I just sketched lead to Fuller's constructive account of law, with its
legal-pluralist conclusions: that the kind of empirical fact law is is both empirical
and normative; that made law cannot exist without implicit law; and that law has
nothing essentially to do with the state because all sorts of groups and interac-
tions make law.
The last of these points is the most important one for understanding the
lawyer's work. In Fuller's pluralist conception of law, law appears wherever
people interact on a regular basis, and the good lawyer is an expert in structuring
these interactions so that the law they make works. Law, hence the work of
lawyers, has to do with regulated interactions, not state power.
Reason in social structure. Fuller uses the metaphor of an "architect of social
structure.", 83 Contemporary scholarship has its own metaphor for what lawyers
do to facilitate deals: business lawyers, in Ronald Gilson's phrase, are "transac-
tion cost engineers. ' ' 84 It may seem, then, that Fuller's view converges with
contemporary law-and-economics scholarship about the legal profession.
To an extent this is true. However, the two metaphors carry radically different
implications. Take the transaction cost engineer, a phrase I assume most educated
readers would find unintelligible. That is because "transaction cost" is a
technical term in a theory. Specifically, it is a technical term in Coasean economic
79. Fuller compliments Hans Kelsen for his forthrightness in acknowledging that the "basic norm" is a
postulate, not a fact. Id. at 70, note 27.
80. Id. at 54-55.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id.
83. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1.
84. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills andAsset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239,
255 (1984).
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theory. Coase's Theorem tells us that absent transaction costs, goods will move
via bargaining to their most efficient use regardless of initial entitlement.
85
Viewed through Coasean lenses, efficient bargains happen more or less on their
own, once the impediment posed by transaction costs is removed. The business
lawyer's job, according to Gilson, is to add value to deals by reducing transaction
costs - specifically, costs associated with imperfect information, and inconsis-
tent time horizons and risk assumptions among the contracting parties.8 6 Remove
the impediment and deals happen. The term "transaction cost engineer" sounds
analogous to "electrical engineer." Like the electrical engineer, the transaction
cost engineer reduces impedance and gets the current flowing and the circuitry
complete.87
On Fuller's understanding, this is a Cloud Cuckooland version of com-
merce - a fantastic world in which, once the engineer gets those nasty old
transaction costs out of the way, paper towels fly on their own into service station
rest rooms. Fuller wants us to realize that commerce confronts parties with an
endless variety of stubborn realities, ranging from genuine transaction costs, such
as the cost of faxing documents to and fro, to inconvenient physical properties of
paper towel dispensers. The latter can be regarded as transaction costs only by
broadening the category of transaction costs to the point of vacuity (if a
transaction cost is anything that impedes efficient outcomes, then Coase's
Theorem becomes a tautology). People can and should deal in a reasoned way
with stubborn realities - in fact, reasoning through stubborn realities is pretty
much what Fuller means by "natural law thinking," a term that for him carries
overtones of natural science rather than religion - and the lawyer's role is to
design an interactive framework that helps them do so. 88 But describing the
application of reason to stubborn realities as transaction cost engineering flattens
the landscape beyond recognition.
The "architect of social structure" metaphor is a better one. An architect
85. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
86. Gilson, supra note 84.
87. Avery Katz has pointed out in conversation that the "engineer" part of "transaction cost engineer" has
the virtue of describing lawyers' activities in humble and down-to-earth terms, avoiding some of the
extravagances of views that put lawyers on a pedestal as servants of justice. While I dislike the metaphor of
"transaction cost engineering," I agree that this is one of its virtues.
88. In one paper, Fuller observes that "for many the term 'natural law' still has about it a rich, deep odor of
the witches' cauldron." Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REv. 377, 379 (1946). But all
it really means is
that there are external criteria, found in the conditions required for successful group living, that
furnish some standard against which the rightness of... decisions should be measured .... Certainly
it would never occur to [an imaginary judge] to describe the natural law he sought to discover, and felt
bound to respect, as a "brooding omnipresence in the skies." Rather for him it would be a hard and
earthy reality that challenged his best intellectual efforts to capture it. The emotional attitude ...
would not be that of one doing obeisance before an altar, but more like that of a cook trying to find the
secret of a flaky pie crust .... Id.
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familiarizes herself with the generic activities a building's inhabitants will
engage in, but living in the building is up to the inhabitants. The architect
likewise has to understand the practical problems of construction, even though
her role is quite different from that of the builder. By analogy, a business lawyer
designs a framework of interaction - grievance and reporting procedures, clear
lines of authority, arbitration clauses, requirements for regularly-scheduled
conferences. Someone analogous to the builder will proceed to implement the
structure, and the parties can then get on with the business at hand. The lawyer's
job is to help all parties understand the obstacles their counterparts face, so that
they can accommodate each other and get the job done. The lawyer's objectives
"include, for example, . . . anticipating possible sources of trouble and devising
procedures that will put out the fire of controversy while it is still manageable,
and generally constructing a satisfactory framework for the parties' future
dealings." 89
One might object that this really is "transaction cost engineering" by a
different name. The parties begin in relative ignorance of the problems they face,
and the lawyer helps them remove their ignorance, minimize their risks, and
bargain with more information. But this objection misses the mark. The point of
transaction cost engineering is to remove obstacles to striking an efficient
bargain: the transaction cost engineer does not look further ahead than consum-
mating the deal. She views imperfect information as a kind of noise that prevents
the parties from establishing accurate valuations and prices; better information
facilitates the deal. Human interactions and conversations get classified as
"costs." 90 The architect of social structure, by contrast, regards them as benefits,
and views the deal as the beginning, not the endpoint, of her client's interest. The
information she aims to elicit for her client is only partly information needed for
asset pricing. Far more important is information about how to get paper towels
into service stations after the contract is signed.
In part, the difference might arise from focusing on different kinds of business.
The theory of transaction cost engineering originated in the roaring eighties, and
focuses on corporate finance and corporate acquisitions. 9 ' In the specialized
markets for venture capital and corporate control, the point is to make money by
making deals.92 From a corporate finance standpoint, the deal is the point. But
from Fuller's standpoint - and, I suspect, from a saner economic standpoint -
the point of deals is to establish productive relationships, which involves
knowledge of a great many things besides how much an asset is worth.
89. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 63, at 254.
90. I owe this observation to Wendy Perdue.
91. Gilson, supra note 84, examines the theory entirely within these contexts.
92. In 1990, partners from New York City's premier mergers-and-acquisitions law firm performed a skit at a
firm gathering. "The loudest applause for the Not Ready for Prime Time Partners came as they sang 'There Is
Nothing Like a Deal!' knocked off from South Pacific. 'What ain't we got?' the punch line asked: 'We ain't got
deals!' " LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 236 (1993).
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The similarities, as well as the important differences, between Fuller's "archi-
tect of social structure" and Gilson's "transaction cost engineer" provide another
example of Fuller's partial eclipse. In a foreword to a 1995 symposium on
business lawyering, Gilson and his co-author Professor Mnookin reminisced,
"Ten years ago, when one of us first wrote about what business lawyers really do,
no one had devoted much attention to this part of the profession.",93 (Fuller who?)
Now, however, it has become clear "that lawyers can often create value, not just
as business lawyers who serve as transaction cost engineers, but also as litigators
who cooperate to facilitate efficient dispute resolution, and as process architects
who design efficient systems to resolve conflict outside of court at low CoSt."
9 4
The authors' pleasure that scholars now take business lawyers seriously is
justified, but - in view of the fact that Fuller explored all these themes decades
ago - their claim to novelty is not (notice that Gilson and Mnookin have
reinvented Fuller's metaphor of lawyers as "process architects").
One might respond that contemporary scholarship has gone far beyond Fuller,
because it utilizes "theoretical advances from the social sciences" such as
"[t]ransaction cost economics, the economics of information, the positive theory
of agency, and the theoretical basis of negotiation.", 95 Furthermore, today's legal
scholar can "switch to cognitive psychology or sociology to fully close the jaws
of our analytic vice."
96
Now Fuller himself understood that problems of institutional design "tran-
scend the boundaries of any particular 'social discipline,' ,97 and he anticipated
that organizational sociology, social psychology, and especially the still-nascent
discipline of organizational economics would all contribute to their solution.98
In one sense, then, the economics-based interdisciplinary approach that Gilson
and Mnookin embrace may be the "eunomics"- the science of institutional de-
sign - that Fuller thought natural-law thinking would bring to birth.
However, I fear that rumors of its nativity are exaggerated. Unfortunately, the
present state of the sciences of institutional design calls to mind not Gilson and
Mnookin's "fully closeld] jaws of our analytic vice" but Oliver Wendell
Holmes's description of one of his fellow Supreme Court Justices, whose mind
was "a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than two inches to
each other." 99
93. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74
OR. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
94. Id. at 7-8.
95. Id. at 6-7.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 266.
98. Id. at 267-68.
99. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932 8 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (describing the first Justice Harlan).
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Take, for example, a problem dear to Fuller's own heart and central to
institutional design: the question of whether a business firm should coordinate
production among divisions by the use of price information or by managerial
directives - in Fuller's terms, whether the firm should be organized by
reciprocity or by common ends and managerial control. Beginning with the
debate about socialist economies between Oskar Lange and Friederich Hayek in
the 1930s, economists have come to realize that the question turns in large
measure on which system is better at communicating information; or, putting the
problem the other way around, the question turns on which system imposes fewer
informational demands. Contemporary economists typically use the so-called
"Hurwicz criterion," which measures a system's informational demands by
asking how many numbers must be communicated to make a decision: the system
that requires the fewest numbers is informationally efficient. 1 ° Using this
criterion, Hurwicz proved that under certain restrictions, price mechanisms place
the lightest informational demands on systems, thereby verifying Hayek's intu-
ition about the superiority of market mechanisms in comparison to centrally
planned economies.o
Unfortunately, Hurwicz's restrictions eliminate the entire class of problems
that most interested Fuller because they are most typical of the business
environment: problems in which producers are not uniquely well situated to
know their own productive capabilities, because that knowledge depends on
similar information about other producers; or in which, for the same reason,
consumers aren't uniquely well situated to know their own preferences; or in
which the decisions have so-called "design attributes" - "problems in which
there is a great deal of a priori information about the form of the optimal solution,
that is, about how the variables should be related .... ,,1o2 In other words, the
informational efficiency theorem does not apply to situations where interaction
among producers and among consumers might be necessary for them to discover
their own capabilities and preferences, or where reasoned analysis might provide
information to simplify the problem. When a decision has design attributes, the
principal theorem is "that the informationally efficient way to handle such a
problem is to announce the design attributes" 10 3 - hardly a startling conclusion,
nor one requiring sophisticated economic theory. Moreover, the Hurwicz crite-
rion itself is quite crude, because "it does not account for how quickly different
systems find an efficient allocation or for how much information they communi-
cate in the process .... So far, however, the Hurwicz criterion is the only measure
of communication requirements which has been extensively and success-
100. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 102 (1992).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 91.
103. Id. at 121.
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fully analyzed."'o4
In that case, the conclusion seems to be that even if theorists can derive
mind-boggling mathematical results about information spaces, the theory does
little to advance practical understanding of the problem of institutional design. Of
course I do not mean to suggest that economic theory has nothing to contribute to
institutional design; my point is that - as this example suggests - the current
state of the theory does not support the suspicion that Fuller's ideas have been left
in the dust by "theoretical advances from the social sciences."
V. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Thus far, I have been presenting Fuller's ideas about the work of lawyers
sympathetically. But there are plenty of points where doubts arise. For example,
Fuller's argument connecting the definition of law to the nature of lawyers' work
seems a little too pat to be plausible. It cannot really be that a turn-of-the-century
legal formalist did nothing to advise clients except explain the logic of legal
concepts to them, nor that realists routinely drafted contracts giving no thought to
how the contracts might be executed successfully. It is often said that good
psychotherapists of different "schools" resemble each other more than they
resemble mediocre therapists of the same school. It seems more than likely that
good lawyers are like that as well.
Second, even if positivism is "overprimed with power" 105 and overly statist,
Fuller seems vulnerable to the converse charge that he is too sympathetic to
customary orderings that the state ought to police. The obvious examples are
racist and sexist institutions, but the problem is more pervasive than that. An
interesting example in legal ethics is the American bar's understanding of
confidentiality, which places it at the pinnacle of professional obligations and
draws its boundaries much more expansively than legal doctrine actually war-
rants. 10 6 In practice, an absolute norm of confidentiality serves little purpose
beyond facilitating cover-ups by crooked clients, and courts should not tolerate
(but frequently do tolerate) a lawyer's defiance of requests to produce unprivi-
leged information. 107 The bar's "law" of confidentiality is inferior to the state's
law, yet Fuller has no strong argument for state supremacy. Like Burke, Fuller
may over-romanticize the organic harmony of "autonomous orderings."
Both these criticisms deserve further discussion, but I propose to drop them
and turn to a third. What seems conspicuously absent from Fuller's "architect of
104. Id. at 102.
105. Fuller, On Legal Education, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 277.
106. Susan Koniak, one of the most interesting contemporary anti-positivists in legal ethics, has extensively
analyzed the clash between the bar's "law" of confidentiality and that of the state. Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992).
107. Id.
1998]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
social structure" is what most people probably regard as the most salient fact
about lawyers: that they are partisans for their clients. Contrary to Fuller's simile,
lawyers drawing up a contract are not drafting "a kind of constitution," 10 8 for
that implies treating all parties with equal concern. They are supposed to be
getting the best deal for their clients. Sometimes that means the best deal for all
the parties, but sometimes it doesn't - and when it doesn't, lawyers are supposed
to take sides.
Fuller and Randall preface the Joint Conference Report by acknowledging that
"the chief obstacle" to "understanding the nature of the lawyer's professional
responsibilities" lies in the adversary system.'0 9 Even law students are uneasy
about the adversary system, "some thinking of it as an unwholesome compro-
mise with the combativeness of human nature, others vaguely approving of it but
disturbed by their inability to articulate its proper limits." "o Again and again, in
the Joint Conference Report, in The Adversary System, 1' in The Philosophy of
Codes of Ethics, in Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, Fuller returns to the
adversary system and its defense. He moves from one argument to another,
suggesting that he may not have been entirely happy with any of them. Nor
should he have been.
In the "narrow sense," Fuller tells us, the adversary system is "a certain
philosophy of adjudication," one that sharply separates the role of judge from
that of advocate." 2 The advocate presents his party's case with partisan zeal; he
has "dedicated all the powers of his mind to its formulation." 113 The judge listens
and renders an impartial decision. The principal questions that any defender of
the adversary system must answer are why we should deliberately set highly
trained, intelligent lawyers to work zealously advancing their clients' ends,
regardless of the morality or even minimal decency of those ends; why we should
praise lawyers for utilizing means that can inflict substantial trauma on perfectly
innocent people (on honest witnesses, for example, whose competence or grip on
reality a cross-examiner publicly assails); why, finally, should we ask lawyers to
disregard entirely the legitimate interests of their adversaries - to refrain, for
example, from correcting an opposing lawyer's blunder that loses a case the
opponent should rightfully win.
In the Joint Conference Report, Fuller argues that even though the adversary
system seems to require lawyers to obscure the truth on behalf of their clients, the
system is actually more likely to arrive at the truth than an inquisitorial
108. Fuller, Lawyer as Architect, supra note 1, at 265.
109. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1159.
110. Id.
11. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Fuller, The Adversary System].
112. Id. at 30.
113. Id. at 31.
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alternative where the judge rather than the lawyer conducts the inquiry." 4 He
bases the argument on the psychological impossibility of a single mind formulat-
ing the strongest version of two contradictory positions:
Any arbiter who attempts to decide a dispute without the aid of partisan
advocacy.., must undertake not only the role of judge, but that of representa-
tive for both of the litigants. Each of these roles must be played to the full
without being muted by qualifications derived from the others. When he is
developing for each side the most effective statement of his case, the arbiter
must put aside his neutrality and permit himself to be moved by a sympathetic
identification sufficiently intense to draw from his mind all that it is capable of
giving .... When he resumes his neutral position, he must be able to view with
distrust the fruits of this identification and be ready to reject the products of his
own best mental efforts .... If it is true that a man in his time must play many
parts, it is scarcely given to him to play them all at once.'
1 5
This argument, plausible though it appears on the surface, should set off an alarm
in the minds of readers, because it leads to the startling conclusion that the
various judge-driven systems of continental Europe and South America must be
worse fact-finders than their common law counterparts. There is no evidence that
this is so, and Fuller was a good enough comparativist to have known better."
6
What Fuller claims is psychologically impossible turns out to be daily practice in
civil law systems. Sybille Bedford, who observed trials in several countries,
wrote this about a German criminal trial:
It was a strange experience to hear this presentation of a case by both sides, as it
were, in one; not a prosecution case followed by a defen[s]e case, but an
attempt to build the whole case.., as it went. A strange experience.., to hear
all questions, probing questions and soothing questions, accusatory and absolv-
ing questions, questions throwing a favourable light and questions having the
opposite effect, flow from one and the same source, the bench .... 1 7
What Bedford found "strange" she nevertheless found extremely effective as
well. Perhaps a trained judge can play all parts at once. 118 If so, then where's the
error in Fuller's argument?
114. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
115. Id.
116. Fuller's colleagues Benjamin Kaplan and Arthur von Mehren published pioneering articles on German
civil procedure in the Harvard Law Review the same year that the Hart-Fuller debate appeared, and there can be
little doubt that Fuller, who had a strong interest in German legal thought, knew their work. Benjamin Kaplan, et
al., Phases of German Civil Procedure 1, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1958); Benjamin Kaplan, et al., Phases of
German Civil Procedure 11, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1443 (1958). There is, however, reason to believe that Fuller was
in fact deeply suspicious of Continental procedure. See Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 36
(criticizing Continental criminal procedure).
117. SYBILLE BEDFORD, THE FACES OF JUSTICE: A TRAVELER'S REPORT 117 (1961).
118. Of course, one might respond that Continental systems are adversarial. Judges don't proceed in a
vacuum; rather, they work from written, partisan, submissions by the litigants' attorneys.
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One problem is that it begs the question. When Fuller writes, "Each of these
[representative] roles must be played to the full without being muted by
qualifications derived from the others," " 9 he is presupposing that the inquiry
proceeds best by unmuted adversary presentation, in which case, of course, an
inquisitorial investigation becomes by definition a mere copy of the real thing. In
The Adversary System, Fuller likewise insists that decision-makers must be able
to hear each side's position stated in its strongest form, which only partisan
advocacy provides.'2 ° But is it not equally possible that a decision-maker can
form a more reliable picture if the opposed positions are muted by qualifications
derived from each other? After all, the strongest form of each side's case may be
strongest because it is exaggerated and misleading - "to use a harsher expres-
sion, biased." 121 The opponent may be able to smoke out the exaggeration, but
there will inevitably be cases in which the decision-maker simply cannot sort
through the exaggerations, strategic omissions, and false implications, and as a
result decides wrongly.
In addition, Fuller's argument proves far too much: it proves the impossibility
not merely of reliable inquisitorial investigation, but of partisan advocacy as
well. Any skilled lawyer preparing a case tries to anticipate the strongest
arguments available to the adversary, preferably in their most devastating form.
When she sizes up her witnesses, she puts herself in her opponent's shoes and
probes for weaknesses in the witness's story; she digs for damaging information
the opponent might unearth about the witness. Then she tries to construct
counterarguments to the opponent's best arguments and to anticipate counterargu-
ments to her counterarguments. In short, she employs precisely the mental
progression - from sympathetic identification with her own position, to detach-
ment from it, to distrust of it, and then back again - that Fuller claims is
psychologically impossible for the inquisitorial judge.
The Joint Conference Report employs two additional psychological arguments
against inquisitorial tribunals. The first is that the adversary system will "hold the
case ... in suspension between two opposing interpretations of it,"'5 22 so the
finder of fact won't jump to hasty conclusions. The inquisitorial judge, by
contrast, inevitably forms preliminary conceptions of the case, and will quite
naturally become so invested in these working hypotheses that he may hang on to
This response is unconvincing. The judges still take the active role in questioning witnesses and eliciting
further submissions and further evidence, and the lawyers assume a role considerably more passive than their
American counterparts. To offer one telling example, German ethics rules discourage lawyers from interviewing
witnesses and forbid lawyers from preparing them, whereas an American lawyer who does not prepare
witnesses for trial has done an inadequate job. The German judge takes the written submissions as a beginning
point, but need not confine the inquiry to those submissions. If Fuller's argument was sound, it would apply to
the half-inquisitorial-half-adversarial systems of Continental procedure.
119. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
120. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 31.
121. Fuller, Codes of Ethics, supra note 36, at 918.
122. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
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them even after they turn out to be false leads. Fuller offers essentially the same
objection to the inquisitorial method in Forms and Limits of Adjudication, "3 and
in The Adversary System, Fuller quotes the Joint Conference Report argument
directly, adding that "adversary presentation of a controversy is perhaps the most
effective means we have of combating the evils of bureaucracy." 124 An official
who judges hastily on the basis of preconceptions is the very definition of "the
term 'bureaucrat' in a critical sense." 1
25
Second, if the judge and not the lawyer had to "absorb" the embarrassment of
her initial theory of the case being exploded in court, she would be "under a
strong temptation to keep the hearing moving within the boundaries originally set
for it." 126 That would turn a fair trial into a mere "public confirmation for what
the tribunal considers it has already established in private." 1
27
These arguments, unlike the previous one, have a well-confirmed psychologi-
cal basis. The theory of cognitive dissonance holds that when we perform an
action, our beliefs become more congruent with the action. 12 8 In a classic
experiment, subjects paid a small amount of money to perform a boring,
repetitive experimental task came to believe that it was actually rather interesting,
while well-paid subjects did not. The well-paid subjects could rationalize wasting
their time by thinking "I did it for the money"; the poorly paid subjects had to
eliminate the dissonance by reconfiguring their beliefs. 129 An inquisitorial judge,
pursuing her theory of the case, will call witnesses, request evidence, and ask
questions. To abandon the line of inquiry is tantamount to admitting that she has
been wasting everyone's time. Here, she eliminates cognitive dissonance by
continuing to believe that her theory of the case is plausible even when it should
be abandoned.
The problem with the argument, of course, is that the shortcomings of
inquisitorial procedure do not necessarily put it at a comparative disadvantage to
adversarial procedure. The adversary system has its own shortcomings, which
derive from the fact that zealous advocates can sometimes obfuscate successfully
to win a weak case. In addition, many "inquisitorial" courts use multi-judge
panels, which mutes the psychological distortions of cognitive dissonance. If one
judge becomes overly invested in a fruitless line of inquiry, the other judges can
take the reins.
123. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at
104 [hereinafter Fuller, Forms and Limits].
124. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 40.
125. Id. When he approvingly quotes the Joint Conference Report argument in The Adversary System, Fuller
disingenuously refers to it as "a statement issued recently by a committee of the American Bar Association"
without mentioning that he wrote the statement. Id. at 39.
126. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1161.
127. Id.
128. See generally, LIONEL FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
129. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SrruATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 66 (1991).
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VI. PARTISANSHIP AS A PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN NATURE
Speculative arguments, like those of the Joint Conference Report, will never
establish that the adversary system is a mightier instrument of truth than its
alternatives, because the issue is not a speculative one. It is an empirical issue,
one that is virtually impossible to investigate. For that reason, perhaps, Fuller
turned in The Adversary System to arguments of a different character -
normative arguments more in keeping with his general theory of adjudication. 
130
For Fuller, "the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that
it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision,
that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.
Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts adjudication toward
its optimum expression. Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation
destroys the integrity of adjudication itself." 131 In The Adversary System, Fuller
uses this criterion to defend the role of the advocate in criminal trials (a defense
he subsequently extends to civil trials as well):
When the matter comes for final trial in court, the only participation accorded to
the accused in that trial lies in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned
arguments on his behalf. This opportunity cannot be meaningful unless the
accused is represented by a professional advocate. If he is denied this represen-
tation[,] the processes of public trial become suspect and tainted. It is for this
reason that I say that the integrity of society itself demands that the accused be
represented by counsel. 132
In both the passages just quoted, Fuller speaks of "presenting proofs and
reasoned arguments." But this blameless, rationalistic activity is quite different
from "the function of the advocate," whose "task is ... to persuade. He is not
expected to present the case in a colorless and detached manner, but in such a way
that it will appear in that aspect most favorable to his client." 133 The difference
takes us straight back to the critique of rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias. There,
Socrates gets Gorgias to admit that the rhetorician "is not a teacher of law courts
and other public gatherings as to what is right or wrong, but merely a creator of
beliefs." 134 No advocate should claim anything more, and yet Fuller conflates
partisan advocacy with proof and reasoned argument.
I do not believe that Fuller is guilty of a simple confusion, however. On the
contrary, I think that he has deep but mistaken reasons for identifying "proofs
and reasoned arguments" with interest-based persuasion. Consider three charac-
130. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 36-43 (defending the adversary system on grounds that
it enhances the integrity of society).
131. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 123, at 92.
132. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 36-37.
133. Id. at31.
134. PLATO, GORGiAs 14 (W.C. HeImbold trans. 1952; *455a).
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teristic passages. First, from The Adversary System: "It is the task of the advocate
to help the judge and jury to see the case as it appears to interested eyes, in the
aspect it assumes when viewed from that corner of life into which fate has cast his
client." 135 Second, from the Joint Conference Report: "The lawyer appearing as
an advocate before a tribunal presents, as persuasively as he can, the facts and the
law of the case as seen from the standpoint of his client's interest."' 36 And third, a
simple, telling phrase from The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, where Fuller
argues that it is an advocate's "task during the deliberations to represent an
interest, a point of view." 137
The passages are identical in thought and similar in phrasing, and the key to
understanding them lies in the six words I have italicized in the final passage: an
interest, a point of view. The syntax shows that Fuller identifies interests with
points of view. The identification appears in the first passage as well, where the
case as it appears to interested eyes gets identified with the case in the aspect it
assumes when viewed from that corner of life into which fate has cast the client.
The Joint Conference Report passage speaks only of "the case as seen from the
standpoint of his client's interest." '
38
The implication seems to be this: Fuller simply doesn't believe that there is
such a thing as a disinterested point of view, a point of view in which (to borrow a
phrase from Jirgen Habermas) the only interest is a cognitive interest. 39 In one
essay, he cites Polanyi and Kuhn as authorities for the proposition that "there is
always in any given science.., a tacit commitment to certain lines of inquiry as
offering the only legitimate outlet for the scientific spirit."' 40 This paraphrase, of
course, harmonizes with the psychological argument in the Joint Conference
Report, that without precommitments there can be no inquiry. 4 1 But I suspect
that what attracted Fuller to Polanyi's and Kuhn's view of science is not their
psychology, but their epistemology - their insistence that personal and political
interests define, not impede, the pursuit of knowledge.
Yet, surely an interest and a point of view are quite different. My viewpoint
discloses facts as I believe them to be; the standpoint of my interest discloses
facts as I want them to be. No distinction could be more basic, and no
epistemology that denies it deserves to be taken seriously. Without the distinc-
tion, we could make no sense of such fundamental human experiences as
embarrassment or remorse - the emotions characteristic of someone who wishes
135. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 32.
136. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
137. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 123, at 114 (emphasis added).
138. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
139. JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 196-98 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 2nd ed. 1978)
(defining "cognitive interest").
140. Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at
72 (citing Michael Polany and Thomas Kuhn).
141. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1160.
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the world were different, someone whose case as seen from his standpoint differs
from his case as seen from the standpoint of his interest. And, to return to Fuller's
argument for partisan advocacy, we can agree with him that an adjudication
should include all points of view without conceding that each point of view
should be spin-doctored by an advocate to advance a party's interest.
Why would Fuller make this mistake? It is a particularly glaring one for
someone who believes that there are objective truths about better and worse ways
to order human affairs. One clue lies in Fuller's remarks about what he calls the
"expanded sense of the adversary system." 142 All human institutions involve
compromises of divergent interests, and an effective compromise requires that
"each party is permitted to state fully what its own interest is and ... urge with
partisan zeal the vital importance of that interest to the enterprise as a whole." 1
43
That is the expanded adversary system - "expanded" in that it is a system for
making decisions in all areas of life. In The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, Fuller
illustrates: "In the total processes of society the engineer, lawyer, physician,
military expert, and the scholar must each pull his oar, but to pull it effectively he
must act to some extent as if it were the only oar, as if it were through his efforts
alone that the ship of state moved forward. This is what is meant by partisan-
ship."' 44At the same time, however, Fuller insists that "partisanship ... must
also be enlightened and tolerant," '45 not only of opposing viewpoints, but also of
partisan advocacy on their behalf. 1
46
Interestingly, Fuller takes the ideal of tolerant partisanship to lie at the heart of
professional ethics. More important, however, is his idea about why tolerant
partisanship is good:
In the end, the justification for the adversary system lies in the fact that it is a
means by which the capacities of the individual may be lifted to the point where
he gains the power to view reality through eyes other than his own, where he is
able to become as impartial, and as free from prejudice, as "the lot of humanity
will admit." 147
Paradoxically, then, for Fuller the point of partisanship is to attain impartiality.
Like Plato, Fuller believed that the human condition is to dwell in a cave of
opinion and prejudice. But, unlike Plato, Fuller doubts that dialectic, philosophy,
or honest intentions can lift us out into the Sun. The inquisitorial judge honestly
intends to get at the truth, but human psychology gets in the way. In ordinary life,
where we lack the judge's sworn commitment to impartiality, we are even worse
situated to escape the Cave. Within the Cave, the only way to see around our own
142. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 41.
143. Id. at 42.
144. Fuller, Codes of Ethics, supra note 36, at 918.
145. Id.
146. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 11, at 42.
147. Id. at 43.
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partisan corner is to imagine the world as it appears from someone else's, and the
point of advocacy is to make the other person's world vivid - to make it easier to
imagine. In an extraordinary passage, Fuller defends a legal ethics combining
partisan advocacy with a detached outlook (tolerant partisanship once again) and
concludes, "I believe that when lawyers have come generally to view their work
in this manner we shall have a society in which philosophers are kings .... , 148
VII. THE LAWYER AS PHILOSOPHER-KING
This remarkable evocation of Plato appears at the end of Fuller's most
revealing discussion of partisan legal ethics. 14 9 There he asks us to imagine a
young lawyer in a firm, five or six years out of law school. When he first began to
practice, the lawyer feared that he might be asked to take on repugnant cases, but
he soon discovered that this was not a real problem. Cases were always gray,
never black and white, so winning them raised few issues of conscience. For that
reason, law has come to seem like a game - a game with high stakes, but an
enjoyable game nevertheless.
Now, Fuller says, let him take a week off for some ruthless, candid introspec-
tion. As he looks at himself as others view him, he is likely to suspect that the law
game, which he admittedly enjoys, is little more than "a sordid trifling with the
public interest, a waste of taxpayers' and clients' money." 150 On further reflec-
tion, however, he will "come to see that a profound morality justifies what may
be called, in the broadest sense, the adversary system and the game-like spirit that
goes with that system." 15
1
In brief, Fuller argues that the competitive spirit fostered by the adversary
system is necessary because, otherwise, nobody could be induced to do the hard
work of investigating facts and constructing arguments - work that Fuller insists.
is in the public interest. 152 "Viewed in this light[,] the zeal of advocacy is one of
those tricks of nature by which a man is lured into serving the public interest
without knowing it .... , Once he sees this, our young lawyer will return to
the game with a clear conscience. But he will want to play the law game
differently. Instead of seeking only victory, he will now seek "that -double
satisfaction that comes from serving both his client and the public interest." 
154
148. Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at
290.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 288.
151. Id. at 289.
152. Id. at 289-90.
153. Id. at 290. This striking formulation echoes a letter Holmes wrote to John Wu (which Fuller may have
read), in which Holmes describes the belief that life has meaning as "the trick by which nature keeps us at our
job." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Wu (May 5, 1926), in THE MIND AND FArrH OF JUSTICE
HoLMEs: His SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETrERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 430 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
154. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer supra note 148, at 290.
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He will advocate for his client, but remain detached from his client's cause. It is at
this point that he becomes a philosopher-king.
Although I think that Fuller has brilliantly nailed down the phenomenology of
law practice, I have my doubts about his happy ending. One difficulty with his
solution is psychological: how can anyone combine whole-hearted partisanship
in action with clear-headed philosophical detachment? Cognitive dissonance
theory predicts that detachment will soon give way to rationalization.' 55 At that
point, the philosopher-king will return to the Cave, where "doubts evaporate
after he has worked on the case for a few days; his client's cause then comes to
seem at once logical andjust." 156
Moreover, the lawyer is on the client's team, and loyalty is a powerful force. In
one experiment, subjects were given a supposed "aesthetic preference test" and
told that the test showed them to prefer Klee to Kandinsky. That turned out to be
enough for them to favor other subjects who also supposedly preferred Klee, and
to discriminate against subjects who supposedly preferred Kandinsky. 157 Simi-
larly, thirty-two boys were told, after an experiment in visual perception, that
they belong to a group that overestimates (or underestimates) the number of dots
flashed on a screen. Asked to divide some money among the other boys, they
systematically discriminated in favor of their own group and against the other.1
58
Results like these suggest that it will be very hard for the lawyer to play the law
game with the public interest in mind.
But even if the lawyer does keep the public interest in mind, Fuller has assumed the
problem away. What if a lawyer cannot serve both the client and the public
interest, because what the client wants is not in the public interest? What makes
the hard labor of advocacy "work that is vital in the public interest?" 159 Fuller has no
answer to these questions; and, lacking answers to them, I believe that he has no
fully satisfactory argument for the adversary system and partisan advocacy, unless
what he means by partisan advocacy turns out not to be so partisan after all.
VIII. THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY
Let us, then, turn to Fuller's ideas about the ethical limits on advocacy. Fuller
tells us that once we understand the public interest served by the adversary system,
it becomes clear by what principle limits must be set to partisanship. The
advocate plays his role well when zeal for his client's cause promotes a wise
and informed decision of the case. He plays his role badly, and trespasses
155. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 287.
157. See ERVIN STAUB, THE ROOTS OF EvrL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP VIOLENCE 58
(1989) (describing results reported in H. Tajfel et aL., Societal Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, I
EUROPEAN J. OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 149 (1971)).
158. Id. at 58.
159. Fuller, Philosophyfor the Practicing Lawyer supra note 148, at 289.
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against the obligations of professional responsibility, when his desire to win
leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision, when, instead of lending a
needed perspective to a controversy, he distorts and obscures its true nature.' 
60
I have no quarrel with the argument. The trouble is that its conclusion is a version
of advocacy so watered down that no champion of the adversary system can
accept it.
Consider, for example, complaints by the president of a lawyers' organization
about a recent American innovation in which jurors are permitted to question
witnesses directly. "You work very hard to keep certain information out of the
trial. Then all of your finesse and art and technique are thrown out the window
when a juror comes in and asks, 'Where were you on the night in question?' ,,61
In other words, his objection to the innovation is precisely that it prevents lawyers
from "muddy[ing] the headwaters of decision." Fuller invariably thinks of advocacy
as a means for injecting more arguments and information into hearings, but the
example illustrates what every trial lawyer knows: the real finesse and art and
technique of advocacy lies in keeping arguments and information out of hearings.
Consider another example. A criminal defense lawyer "may not, to free his
client, cast suspicion on innocent persons." 162 i fact, casting suspicion on innocent
persons is one of the most common techniques of the defender, and every
defender that I know would regard failing to use the technique as close to malprac-
tice. 163 In cases involving multiple defendants, there is often no defense to offer
except the argument that the client's partner, not the client, was the trigger-man.
My point is not to defend the standard conception of advocacy. On the
contrary, I much prefer Fuller's conception. My point is simply that what Fuller
envisions is far from adversary advocacy as common-law lawyers understand
and practice it. Fuller said that he was defending the adversary system, and I am
quite sure that he meant what he said. But, in the end, what he really believed in
was the lawyer as "architect of social structure." And when Fuller insisted that
"the view that sees [the lawyer] primarily as an expert in structure can be
interpreted to embrace his activities as an advocate in litigation," he was
indulging in wishful thinking. In Fuller's eyes, the advocate is a "partisan
collaborator"' 64 in a process that pushes parties toward a peaceful settlement. 
165
But interests cannot always be reconciled; and, when they can't be, there simply
is no such thing as a partisan collaborator.
160. Fuller & Randall, Joint Conference Report, supra note 28, at 1161.
161. Bill Miller, Making a Case For Questions From Jurors; Process, Rare Now, Is Judicial Trend of Future,
Backers Say, WASH. POST, May 26, 1997, at Al.
162. Fuller, The Adversary System, supra note 111, at 38.
163. Nor is casting guilt upon the innocent a uniquely American or uniquely contemporary legal technique.
See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 192-204 (1973) (discussing fascinating nineteenth-
century British cases).
164. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 63, at 253.
165. Id.
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